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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
by paying compensatory royalties to its lessor computed on one-
half the production of the presumed draining well. Making such
payments merely permits the lessee to evaluate further the pro-
ducing well and will not alone be sufficient to continue the lease
in force; however, the lessee's right to rebut the above presump-
tions is not prejudiced by compensatory royalty payments. In
addition to the specific offset obligation outlined above, the
lessee also has the general obligation either to drill an offset well,
form a drilling or production unit, or take any other action
reasonably necessary to prevent drainage. Further, if the lessee
is the operator, or has a working interest in any well on ad-
joining property, he has ninety days from the time he knows
or reasonably should know drainage is occurring to drill an offset
well or to take other action reasonably necessary to protect the
leased premises from drainage. Should he fail to act within
ninety days, damages are computed from the time the lessee
knows or should know drainage is occurring.
The equities in such a plan are apparent. In the specific off-
set provision it is the lessee who has the burden of ascertaining
whether drainage is in fact occurring-a task he is well-equipped
to handle. By paying the compensatory royalties, the lessee buys
time during which he can conduct the necessary tests to deter-
mine what future course of action is required. At the same time
the lessor is saved from having to act as watchdog on the ad-
joining premises while being reimbursed in case his premises
are actually being drained. In the case of operations not covered
by the express offset provision the same result as that of the
Williams case is achieved.
The Williams decision places the lessor closer to parity with
the lessee; still, adequate defenses and protections are available
to prevent the latter from being treated unjustly. For this
reason, it is hoped that Williams will stand and that Louisiana
courts will see fit to affirm the proposition that it correctly states
the law of Louisiana.
James Louis Williams, IV
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY-ABOLITION OF THE DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY THEORY OF CITY-STATE PROSECUTIONS
A group of looters removed a canvas mural from the City
Hall of St. Petersburg, Florida. When the mural was recovered
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in a damaged condition, petitioner was arrested, charged, and
found guilty of violating two city ordinances in municipal court.'
The state of Florida then filed an information charging petitioner
with grand larceny based on the same acts involved in the vio-
lation of the ordinances. Against petitioner's claim that he was
being twice put in jeopardy, the state argued that municipalities
and the state are separate sovereign entities, each capable of
imposing punishment for the same alleged crime. The trial court
rejected petitioner's claim; the Florida appellate court sustained
the conviction,2 and the Supreme Court of Florida refused cer-
tiorari.8 The United States Supreme Court held, the theory of dual
sovereignty is inapplicable to successive city-state prosecutions
and the trial of the petitioner in state court for the same offense
tried previously in city court violated the United States Con-
stitution's guarantee against double jeopardy. Waller v. Florida,
90 S. Ct. 1184 (1970).
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy4
in the United States Constitution was made applicable to state
proceedings in Benton v. Maryland,5 where the court overruled
Palko v. Connecticut0 which had long stood for the proposition
that the prohibition against double jeopardy was not so inher-
ent in the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice"7 that
it need be imposed upon the state courts. The Benton ruling
caused no great reaction in the states, however, because the guar-
antee against double jeopardy was one of "the universal maxims
of the common law" and clauses similar to the federal double
1. The violations charged were "first, destruction of city property; and
second, disorderly breach of the peace." 90 S. Ct. 1184, 1185 (1970).
2. Waller v. State, 213 So.2d 623 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1968).
3. Waller v. State, 221 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1968).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
5. 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969): "[We today find that the double jeopardy
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our
constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko
v. Connecticut is overruled." This decision has been affirmed in several sub-
sequent decisions: Price v. Georgia, 90 S. Ct. 1757 (1970); Ashe v. Swenson,
90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
6. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
7. Id. at 328: "Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the Estate] stat-
ute has subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking that our policy
will not endure it? Does it violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'?
Hebert v. Louisiana, [272 U.S. 312 (1926)] .... The answer must surely be
'no.'"
8. R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 478 (1965).
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jeopardy provision were contained in most, if not all, state con-
stitutions.0
The major problem in the area of double jeopardy has been
in defining the term "same offense" in the double jeopardy clause.
Over the years, the majority of state and federal courts have
developed three basic tests to determine when a second trial will
constitute double jeopardy. By the same transaction test, re-
prosecution is barred if defendant's criminal conduct consti-
tuted a single act or transaction. 10 By the same evidence test,
a second trial is not allowed if the same evidence is required to
sustain both charges." The test of collateral estoppel means
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been deter-
9. Id. See also LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9: "[N]or shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, except on his own
application for a new trial, or where there is a mistrial, or a motion In
arrest of judgment is sustained." See also Comment, 21 LA. L. Rav. 615
(1961): "The maxim 'nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life
or liberty for the same offense' is incorporated into Article I, Section 9, of
the Louisiana Constitution. Although the phraseology may differ, this maxim
is accepted in all federal and state courts."
10. See Comment, 75 YALE L. J. 262, 275-76 (1965): "Some state courts, and
legislatures, searching for a more generous approach to the double jeopardy
prohibition, have focused on the 'criminal transaction.' The tests which fol-
low this approach ... depend upon the defendant's behavior, rather than
the evidence or laws. Reprosecution and multiple punishment will be barred
if the defendant's conduct constituted a single act or transaction, or was
motivated by a single intent."
Suppose A attacks B, beats him senseless, and robs him; B dies as a
result of the beatings. A was involved in only one criminal episode, yet, in
Louisiana, he is subject to charges for simple battery, simple robbery, and
murder. LA. R.S. 14:35, 65, 30 (1950). Under the same transaction theory A
must be charged with all three crimes at the same trial or the prosecution
is considered as having waived those charges not made at A's trial.
"If it is only another 'product of a single criminal act' the accused can-
not be placed in jeopardy even though the offenses are not the same. State
v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 A. 416 (1919). In part, this is justified on the
basis that to take a contrary view would be to permit the prosecutor to
obtain successive convictions where several crimes are included within one
another .. " Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39
IOWA L. REv. 317, 325 (1954).
11. Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. (12 Browne) 433, 434 (1871): "A
conviction or acquittal upon one Indictment is no bar to a subsequent con-
viction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a
conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a con-
viction upon the other."
Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915). "IT]he test of identity of
offenses is whether the same evidence is required to sustain them; if not,
then the fact that both charges relate to and grow out of one transaction
does not make a single offense where two are defined by the statutes." Thus,
under the facts in note 10, the same evidence test would allow A to first be
tried for robbery of B and later tried for B's murder if the prosecution
could introduce one additional piece of evidence that had not been used In
A's first trial. See also Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (offenses
are not the same If each contains an element not included in the other).
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mined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.12 Lou-
isiana courts have adopted the same evidence test as their stan-
dard for defining "same offense."18
The dual sovereignty theory upon which the state relied in
Waller to defeat petitioner's claim of double jeopardy was first
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Moore v.
Illinois.'4 Recently, a more succinct explanation of this theory
has been made:
"One of the obvious results of living under our federal
form of government is that every person is subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of two separate governments, the state
and the national. It is entirely possible, therefore, for a
single act to constitute an offense against the statutes of the
United States and at the same time to be punishable under
state law .... A person may be tried and punished by both
governments without violating the protection against double
jeopardy. That guarantee is violated only by a second trial
12. Ashe v. Swenson, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970): "'Collateral estoppel' ...
means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined
by a valid and final judgment, that Issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in any future lawsuit." See Lugar, Criminal Law, Double
Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REv. 317, 331 (1954); Comment, 75
YALE L.J. 262, 283 (1965). Thus, under the facts in note 10 if A were first
tried for B's murder and A defended by establishing and proving an alibi
that he was elsewhere when B was attacked and the jury accepted the alibi
and acquitted A then he could not later be tried for B's robbery since a jury
had already ruled that A was not present when the crime was committed.
13. State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 286, 93 So. 95, 96 (1922): "Identity of the
offenses is an essential element in support of a plea of autre fois [double
jeopardy]. By this is not meant formal, technical, absolute identity; the rule
is that there must be only substantial Identity, that the evidence necessary
to support the second indictment would have been sufficient for the first."
See also LA. CODE CraiM. P. art. 596, comment (a); State v. Foster, 156 La.
891, 101 So. 255 (1924); State v. McGarrity, 140 La. 436, 73 So. 259 (1916). For
instances where the single transaction test has been expressly rejected by
Louisiana courts, see State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960); State
v. Roberts, 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930); State v. Montcrieffe, 165 La.
296, 115 So. 493 (1928); State v. Hill, 122 La. 711, 48 So. 160 (1909); State v.
Barrett, 121 La. 1058, 46 So. 1016 (1908); State v. Faulkner, 39 La. Ann. 811,
2 So. 539 (1887); Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 615, 619-20 (1961).
14. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852): "Every citizen of the United States is
also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to
two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the
laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the
laws of both .... That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an
offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender
has twice been punished for the same offence; but only that he has com-
mitted two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could
not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other."
1971]
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for the same act when it constitutes a separate and distinct
crime against another sovereign."'15
This theory was approved by the Supreme Court in 192216
and has been consistently reaffirmed when applied to successive
federal-state prosecutions; 17 by contrast, it has been held inap-
plicable to successive prosecutions by federal-territorial govern-
ments.'
In Waller, Florida attempted to justify the city prosecution
by asserting that the relationship between a municipality and a
state is analogous to the relationship between a state and the
federal government. The attorneys for the state of Florida relied
upon Abbate v. United States 9 and Bartkus v. United States2
in support of this contention.21 Using the dual sovereignty
theory, Florida courts had developed considerable jurisprudence
allowing successive city-state prosecutions.2 2 In reaching its de-
cision in Waller, the Supreme Court examined Florida's Consti-
tution2 18 and found that Florida municipalities were not separate
15. R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479-80 (1965).
16. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
17. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Jerome v.
United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302
U.S. 253 (1937); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927); Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
"While the Lanza rule has a logical persuasiveness about it and the
Court has done nothing to weaken it, it has not been given wide applica-
tion. It is not, for example, followed in international law .... Nor has the
Court felt the rule should apply In cases where two states have concur-
rent jurisdiction. . . . 'Where an act Is ... prohibited and punishable by
the laws of both States,' the Court commented, 'the one first acquiring juris-
diction of the person may prosecute the offense and its judgment is a final-
ity in both states, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of the one
state cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other.'"
See Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
"The manifest unfairness of the Lanza rule has been widely recognized,
and following the Abbate and Bartkws decisions the Attorney General of
the United States ordered that 'no federal case should be tried when there
has already been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts
without the Unted States Attorney first submitting a recommendation to
the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in the Department.'" R. CUsH-
MAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 941 (1965).
18. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907) (prosecution
by a court of the United States is a bar to a subsequent prosecution by a
territorial court, since both are arms of the same sovereign).
19. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). See also note 17 supra.
20. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See also note 17 supra.
21. 90 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (1970).
22. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1968); Thiesen v.
McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894); Waller v. State, 213 So.2d 623 (Fla.
App. 2d Dist. 1968).
23. Waller v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1184, 1187-88 (1970).
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sovereigns but simply arms of the state government. The Court
decided that the judicial power to try Waller in the municipal
court was based on the same organic law that created the state
court; thus, the proper analogy to the municipal-state relation-
ship was the relationship between a territorial government and
the government of the United States.24 Grafton v. United States,2 5
which held that prosecution by a federal court is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution by a territorial court, was then applied
to the facts of Waller and the dual sovereignty theory was held
inapplicable in this situation. Therefore, the trial in the munic-
ipal court barred any further state prosecution for the same
offense.
The Waller ruling has immediate repercussions in Louisiana,
particularly upon Article 597 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure which provides: "Double jeopardy does not apply to
a prosecution under a law enacted by the Louisiana Legislature
if the prior jeopardy was in a prosecution under the laws of
another state, the United States, or under a municipal or paro-
chial ordinance." (Emphasis added.) It is readily apparent that
the last clause of this article is invalidated by Waller which held
successive city-state prosecutions a violation of the double jeo-
pardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. 26
This invalidity becomes even more apparent after comparing
applicable Louisiana and Florida law. The similarity between
the two states' laws is illustrated by the fact that both Louisi-
ana and Florida, in attempting to justify successive prosecutions,
24. Id. at 1189. Harbingers of this decision may be found in Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964), where Chief Justice Warren said: "Political
subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never
have been considered as sovereign entities." A similar statement was made
much earlier in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907): "Mu-
nicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as con-
venient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State as may be entrusted to them."
25. 206 U.S. 333 (1906). See also note 18 supra.
26. It is submitted that the first portion of the same article may also
be invalid, 4.e., "Double jeopardy does not apply to a prosecution under a
law enacted by the Louisiana Legislature if the prior jeopardy was in a
prosecution under the laws of another state ....... In Nielsen v. Oregon,
212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909) the Court said: "Where an act is malum 4n se
prohibited and punished by the laws of both States, the one first acquiring
jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is
a finality in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts
of the one State cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts
of the other ....
"Doubtless the same rule would apply if the act was prohibited by each
State separately .. "
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based their provisions on the Abbate and Bartkus decisions."7
In addition, the Louisiana Constitution grants the legislature the
power to create courts in the state, including municipal courts,
and to provide for the jurisdiction of all state courts.2s The Lou-
isiana legislature has provided for the election, appointment, and
salaries of municipal court judges.29 Thus, in Louisiana, as in
Florida, the municipal courts are only arms of the state, not
separate sovereignties. Consequently, it is apparent that the dual
sovereignty theory can no longer be relied upon to justify suc-
cessive city-state prosecutions in Louisiana. This proposition is
corroborated by repeated statements in opinions of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana that municipal corporations are creatures of
the state established by the legislature for the purpose of ad-
ministering local affairs of government.80
If rejection of the dual sovereignty theory in successive city-
state prosecutions were the only ramification of Waller, then a
simple amendment of article 597 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure would be the solution. But Waller presents additional
problems. Since Benton v. Maryland3' the United States Supreme
Court has not hesitated in prescribing double jeopardy stan-
dards. 2 In Ashe v. Swenson,3 3 decided the same day as Waller,
the Court held that the theory of collateral estoppel is inherent
in the double jeopardy clause; three concurring Justices 4 in a
joint opinion expressed the view that the same transaction
theory 5 should be incorporated into the Fifth Amendment. Mr.
Justice Brennan echoed this view in Waller.3 6 This theory re-
27. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 597, comment (a) provides: "[T]he article is
simply a codification of the long-standing general jurisprudence to the effect
that where several sovereigns prosecute, the principals of double Jeopardy
do not apply.
"This rule was only recently affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121... (1959); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 . . . (1959)."
28. See LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 51 and 52.
29. See LA. R.S. 13:1872-76 (1950).
30. Edwards v. Town of Ponchatoula, 213 La. 116, 34 So.2d 394 (1948).
See also Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883); Klein v.
New Orleans, 99 U.S. 149 (1878); City of New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644(1877); Pyle v. City of Shreveport, 215 La. 257, 40 So.2d 235 (1948); State
v. Jordan, 207 La. 78, 20 So.2d 543 (1944); Terrebonne Parish School Ed. v.
St. Mary Parish School Ed., 131 So.2d 266 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Johnson
v. City of Natchitoches, 129 So. 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
31. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See note 5 sunpra.
32. See cases cited in note 5 aupra.
33. 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970).
34. Id. at 1197, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall.
35. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
36. 90 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (1970).
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quires the prosecution to charge a defendant with all the offenses
which arose out of one criminal episode, regardless of number
or diversity.87 Any charges not made at the trial are considered
waived by the prosecution.
Statements in the majority opinion in Waller indicate the
possibility that the same transaction theory may soon be incor-
porated into the double jeopardy clause. At the beginning of the
majority opinion Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the sub-
sequent prosecution by the state was based on the same acts of
the petitioner as were involved in the violation of the two city
ordinances.-3 In a subsequent paragraph he reiterated the fact
that the two prosecutions were based on the same acts of the
petitioner3 9 stating: "We act on the statement of the District
Court of Appeal that the second trial on the felony charge by in-
formation 'was based on the same acts of the appellant as were
involved in the violation of the two city ordinances . . ."40
These statements, together with the advocacy of the same trans-
action test in the concurring opinion, intimate possible incorpora-
tion of the same transaction theory into the double jeopardy
clause in the near future.
Further support for this prediction is found in the fact that
the American Law Institute has adopted the same transaction
test for defining the "same offense" for double jeopardy pur-
poses.41 Also, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide
for permissive joinder of charges which are similar in character,
or arise from the same transaction or from connected transac-
tions. England, as well, has adopted the same transaction test.
42
Thus, the consensus of these legal authorities indicates adoption
of the same transaction theory.48
If this theory were adopted, a revision of the present joinder
37. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
38. Waller v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1184, 1185 (1970): "It is conceded that
this information was based on the same acts of the petitioner as were in-
volved in the violation of the two city ordinances."
39. Id.: "The opinion of the District Court of Appeal first explicitly
acknowledged that the charge on which the state court action rested 'was
based on the same acts of the appellant as were involved in the violation
of the two city ordinances.'"
40. Id. at 1186.
41. Compare ALI ADMINisTmON OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, OFFICIAL DRAFT:
DOUBLE JEOPARDY § 5 (1935) (which used the same evidence test) with AIl
MODEL PENAL CODE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAr §§ 1.07(2), 1.09(1)(b) (1962).
42. FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(a). Bee also FED. R. CRIM. P. 13.
43. Ashe v. Swenson, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1190 (1970).
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rules of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure would become
imperative to permit trials of multiple offenses arising from the
same transaction. Under the present Code an indictment may
charge only one offense, 44 except in very specific situations.45 If
the same transaction theory were adopted as a test of double
jeopardy, it would be necessary to charge all of the related of-
fenses in one indictment. Otherwise, a plea of double jeopardy
could be urged when an additional charge or charges were
brought.
As an example of the problems posed by the same transac-
tion theory, suppose that X separately shoots and kills A and B
in the same affray. One objection to charging both homicides in
one indictment and the simultaneous trial is that the mere fact
of cumulation of offenses may create prejudice against X. An-
other objection is that a jury is likely to use evidence introduced
in support of one charge to convict the accused of another charge,
not independently or adequately proved. In the A-murder, X's
intent may not be clear, although another essential element of
the crime may be evident. In the B-murder, only X's intent may
be clearly established. Separately tried, the evidence in each
case may be clearly insufficient to convict the defendant. How-
ever, when the charges are tried together, a jury may erroneously
convict by combining the evidence in both cases to supply a nec-
essary element of the crime.46 The American Bar Association
has recognized the problems created by joinder of offenses, and
its minimum standards authorize severance and separate trial of
the charges if joinder is prejudicial to either the prosecution or
the defense.47 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are in
accord.48
As Justice Brennan points out,49 the same transaction rule,
with required joinder of offenses unless severance is ordered,
will serve a useful purpose in informing the defendant of all the
charges against him, so that he can properly prepare his defense.
Moreover, under the same transaction rule the decision of
whether charges are to be tried jointly or separately rests with
44. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493.
45. See LA. CODE CRiM. P. arts. 481 and 482.
46. Slovenko, The Accusation in Louisiana CriminaZ Law, 32 TUL. L. REV.
47, 71 (1957).
47. ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: JOINDER AND SEVER-
ANCE (1967).
48. FED. R. CEIM. P. 13 and 14.
49. Ashe v. Swenson, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1200 n. 11 (1970).
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the judge rather than the prosecutor. Of course, separate trials
may not be ordered when the evidence will be repetitious, the
multiplicity of trials vexatious, or when the multiplicity will
enable the prosecution to use the experience of the first trial to
strengthen its case in a subsequent trial.50
The actual holding in Waller is both logical and clearly
stated. However, the same transaction concept of double jeop-
ardy may well have opened a veritable Pandora's Box of legal
problems and collateral issues that could have both immediate
and profound effects on the administration of criminal justice
in Louisiana. The best solution to the problems posed by this
concept seems to be the proposal by the American Law Institute
in their Model Penal Code which requires the joinder of all
known offenses in a single trial.51
W. John English, Jr.
DECLARATORY RELIEF IN LOUISIANA: THE POTENTIAL
FOR PROCEDURAL MISUSE
Developers purchased an option on a large tract of land to
be exercised by the payment of almost a million dollars and the
execution of a note and mortgage for the balance of the sale
price.' At the instance of developers the land was rezoned to
permit construction of apartments, a shopping center, and other
non-residential uses. Area residents filed suit seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the ordinances under which the tract was
rezoned 2 were unconstitutional. Developers responded by filing
50. Id.
51. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (1962):
"(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except as
provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appro-
priate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial
and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.
"(3) Authority of court to Order Separate Trials. When a defendant is
charged with two or more offenses based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, the Court, on application of the prosecuting
attorney or of the defendant, may order any such charge to be tried sepa-
rately, if it is satisfied that justice so requires."
1. Cost of the option itself was $40,000. Developers shortly thereafter
expended more than $200,000 in engineering and consulting fees. The option
was to be exercised by the payment of $910,000 and the execution of a mort-
gage for $3,850,000. Total outlay for the completed development was esti-
mated to be approximately $100,000,000.
2. Baton Rouge, La., Ordinance 2317, June 11, 1969; Parish of East Baton
Rouge, La., Ordinance 3095, June 11, 1969.
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